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GLOBAL COMPETITION AND COMMUNITY:
THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Donna L. Chollett

"Neoliberalism is like the Bible; the Bible says, 'He who does not work does not eat'."
(sugar mill manager)
"If we are going to die slowly of hunger, we prefer to die with dignity, from a bullet,
but struggling." (unemployed mill worker)

INTRODUCTION
The above two quotations embody disparate worldviews with regard to the neoliberal
project that has enveloped much of Latin America in the past decade. Globalization
intensifies the region's integration into the world economy through neoliberal reforms
such as market opening, privatizations, and rationalization of production. These
reforms are transforming rural societies, raising important questions concerning
policies that selectively favor new strategies for capital investment and production
oriented toward market expansion, as they marginalize surplus workers and
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"inefficient" forms of production. This paper contributes to a more nuanced
understanding of the contradictions brought about by globalization and local people's
struggles to resist its consequences.
An ample amount of social science research has materialized that focuses on the
impact of globalization, neoliberalism, and other hegemonizing forces upon local
peoples. Solid consensus has emerged that these transformations in production and
marketing place local societies at increasing risk and deny them the most basic rights to
social justice (Carton de Grammont 1995, Gates 1993, Gledhill 1995, Otero 1996,
Phillips 1998). Clearly, while neoliberalism seeks to resolve problems of international
capital accumulation, as an economic model it fails to address the increasing poverty,
social disparities, and political repression that inevitably accompany such
transformations (Carton de Grammont 1995). Economic triage (Gates 1993), premised
on an ideology of efficiency and rationalization of production, constitutes a key
strategy utilized to deny credit to less efficient producers and to dismiss large numbers
of "excess" workers. This hegemony, exercised through exclusion and marginalization
of small-scale producers, poses an important challenge for social science analysis. As
Phillips (1998:194) rightly points out, by "providing concrete proof that neoliberalism
has a negative impact on people's lives, the power of neoliberalism may be dismantled.
But does this strategy, in itself, challenge the neoliberal worldview?" She (1998:196)
continues, "Critical social science requires an engagement that recognizes the
connections between research and politics and that actively listens to representations of
the world that vary from those being offered by this political project called
neoliberalism."
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In this paper, I use a case study from the community of Puruarán, Michoacán,
Mexico, to address significant cultural, social, economic, and political consequences for
sugarcane growers as they confront the globalization of local space. In this case,
neoliberal directives for productive efficiency and market liberalization undermined
social justice, which I take broadly to include rights to employment, basic survival
necessities, family and community reproduction, and freedom from violence and
repression. Yet, as Barkin et al. (1997) point out, there are two significant forces in
dynamic interaction--neoliberalism and resistance to it. Hernández and Nigh (1995)
assert that ideologies associated with globalization tend to underrate the power of local
cultures. Therefore, analysis proceeds by situating the community of Puruarán--whose
sugar mill was closed following privatization--within a global-local nexus (Torres 1997)
that privileges both hegemonic forces on the community and the multiple ways that
hegemony is contested, both discursively and in practice. Globalization increasingly
impinges on local communities, yet it also fosters the reassertion of cultural identity
and political movements in defense of social justice.
GLOBALIZATION IN THE AGE OF NAFTA
Mexico's debt crisis of the past decade served as a catalyst for a series of neoliberal
reforms for restructuring its economy. The new model called for privatization of
industries to promote economic efficiency and profitability and the dismantling of
barriers to international commerce. Two major outcomes of these transformations of
concern to this paper are the privatization of 50 state-owned sugar mills from 1988 to
1992 and the enactment of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994.
Both have brought profound consequences for Mexican sugarcane growers and mill
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workers.
Privatization
During the 1970s, the government gradually assumed ownership of the majority of
Mexican mills, owing to the fact that private owners had decapitalized their mills and
had chosen to invest in more lucrative sectors of the economy. State control over the
price of sugar had discouraged investment in modernizing the mills, leaving most
factories with antiquated machinery. The state takeover of the industry, then,
represented a rescue operation (del Villar 1976). Although some mills remained
private, 50 of the 66 mills in the country came to be operated as parastatal enterprises.
Under government control, the sector was criticized for its overemployment of
workers, inefficiency, and corruption. A change in government policy, along with the
shift to neoliberalism, resulted in the privatization of Mexican sugar mills between
1988-1992. The mills were offered for sale in packages, often of three or four mills, and
at bargain-basement prices (Paré 1990). It was believed that government involvement
in the sugar sector created a drain on public resources, and that private investment
would modernize and rejuvenate the industry (Chollett 1994).
The government controlled distribution of sugar through the parastatal, Azúcar,
S.A., and financed the industry through FINASA (Financiera Nacional Azucarera).
Azúcar, S.A. was dismantled following privatization, leaving sale and distribution of
sugar to market forces. This event occurred at a time when market opening left the
country flooded with cheap, imported sugar. Privatization of the industry has also had
an impact on sugarcane growers through a weakening of traditional guarantees that
were extended to growers under contract to sugar mills. Through years of class
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struggle between their union organizations and the government, growers had obtained
rights to social security, which includes medical insurance, and retirement pensions.
Union strikes had help them achieve price increases for the government-controlled
price of cane. These benefits were carefully spelled out in the Decreto Cañero, a
government decree that specifies rights and obligations on the part of sugar mills and
cane growers. In 1991, the guaranteed minimum price of cane was removed from the
Decreto. Since privatization, the private initiative has attempted to eliminate or reduce
social security benefits. Nonetheless, it is through contracts with sugar mills that
growers have access to pensions and health insurance; these, in fact, are among the key
reasons that many growers produce cane (Chollett 1994).
Traditionally, the high costs of cane production required reliance on credit from
sugar mills. Once growers delivered their cane to the mills, the credit extended for
production and harvest were deducted from the value of the grower's cane. This
process sometimes resulted in a form of neo-debt peonage, leaving cane growers in
perpetual debt to sugar mills (Chollett 1994). The new industrialists, however, are now
restricting the amount of credit given to growers, and requiring them to invest a
portion of their own funds. This practice has forced some poorer growers out of
production, and encouraged those with more financial resources to continue. Changes
in the relationship between growers and mills is thus contributing to greater economic
differentiation among cane growers.
Privatization, an integral part of the neoliberal project, promised to make Mexico
more competitive in the global marketplace. The process of privatization resulted in
the consolidation of 50 sugar mills into 11 consortiums; in addition, ten mills remained
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unaffiliated. These consortiums extended their productive strategies through
horizontal linkages to a variety of enterprises and created vertical linkages for
production and marketing of sugar-based products. The incorporation of 25 mills into
consortiums holding soft drink franchises, such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and Mexican
brands, illustrates this vertical integration. For several years following privatization of
Mexico's sugar mills, a severe crisis besieged the sugar sector. New owners, seeking
speculative profits, failed to invest in modernizing their mills; cane growers rejected
the new management; market opening flooded the country with a surplus of cheap,
imported sugar; and mechanical failures caused unprocessed cane to be left rotting in
the fields and left cane growers with enormous debts to sugar mills. Buyouts of one
consortium by another and the splitting of certain consortiums registered the volatility
of the sugar sector.
By 1994, however, the sugar sector showed signs of recovery. As new investments
rejuvenated the industry, Mexico regained its sugar export capacity and cane growers
were again receiving small profits. By 1997, the industry boasted of impressive
achievements, including greater surface harvested, more cane processed, higher field
yield, more sugar produced, more sugar per hectare, more sucrose in the cane, and
higher factory yield (see Table 1).
In light of record production levels and harvests in the late 1990s, my field
research addressed an essential question: Was this economic recovery under the
neoliberal model uniform? Analysis from the margins and within the interstices of
these broader accomplishments in productive efficiency suggested otherwise. Within
sugar zones, more efficient producers were favored over the less efficient, who were
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marginalized or excluded. Commonly, this result was accomplished through
reduction in the amount of credit that sugar mills extended to cane growers. A
frequent complaint among cane growers in four different research regions1 in 1997 and
1998 was expressed by Blanca, a Michoacán cañera (cane grower) with three hectares of
cane:
The mill only gives us half the credit we need. They give 50 percent and we
pay 50 percent. For this, I am against the mill. Because of this, many people
don't do the work that they should. The cane is like a flower; you give it
water, fertilizer, you take care of it, and it grows very pretty. But without
credit, many cañeros are left with debts.
Inefficient production, as a consequence, was a pretext used by sugar mills to deny
entry of cane from those with fewer resources and to exclude them from cane
production. Although criteria varied among sugar mills, in general, cane growers with
unpaid debts and those with low-yielding cane were subject to exclusion. Mill owners
intended this strategy of weeding out inefficient producers to increase both cane yields
and profitability of their mills. Credit--essential for cane production--was then
rechanneled to more productive growers. In some cases, sugar mills have taken over
growers' cane fields until their debts were paid off, creating substantial hardships for
family survival.
As mill owners adapted to the new structure of neoliberalism in a globalized
world economy, some mill owners chose to exclude less efficient mills by closing them
down, and to consolidate their interests into fewer refineries. The privatization of
sugar mills involved sale packages comprised of both "good" and "bad" sugar mills,
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which ensured the transfer of all mills, efficient and inefficient alike, to the private
sector. Because of the low purchase price paid for their "package," selective closure of
one mill by a corporate group posed little financial loss. Sugar mills that were closed
after privatization include: Ingenio Oacalco, Morelos (1988); Ingenio Estipac, Jalisco
(1988); Ingenio José López Mateos Juchitán, Oaxaca (1992); Ingenio Purísima, Jalisco
(1992); Ingenio Puruarán, Michoacán (1992); and Ingenio Rosales, Sinaloa (1997) (see
Figure 1). While this strategy serves the interest of productive efficiency and
rationalization of production, it disregards the social and economic impact on sugarproducing communities.
Grupo Azucarero Mexico, now affiliated with Pepsico, suffices as an example of
this process. Its owners bought out the now defunct Grupo Sucrum, formerly owned
by Alberto Santos de Hoyos, a corporate entrepreneur who in 1990 sold 72 percent of
his shares in Empresas Gamesa (a major cookie and food processing conglomerate) to
Pepsico. Santos purchased four mills in 1991, forming Grupo Santos. The fate one of
them, the Puruarán mill, was sealed in 1992, when Santos closed the factory, claiming
that it was unprofitable, and consolidated his interests in the remaining three (Alianza
Popular, San Luis Potosí; Bellavista, Jalisco; and Pedernales, Michoacán).2 The
Puruarán refinery had served as the economic hub for an entire region, directly
supporting 2,260 cane growers, 800 cane cutters, 244 truck and tractor drivers, and 530
mill workers. The economic activity and spillover effects directly and indirectly
benefitted 36,050 inhabitants of the region. The closing of the Puruarán sugar mill
illustrates the daunting consequences of globalization, corporate consolidation, and the
marginalization of cane growers and workers unable to compete in the new
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international agricultural order. The closure of the Puruarán mill provides insights
into the struggle that emerged in this community as cane growers and mill workers,
faced with the new logic of globalization, forged a new social movement to demand
social justice.
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)
Hansen-Kuhn (1997) makes clear the relationship between NAFTA and neoliberal
economic policies.3 NAFTA was presaged by a series of IMF-imposed structural
adjustment programs4 following Mexico's 1982 debt crisis; these programs included,
among other demands, free markets and privatizations. Structural adjustment was not
a means for improving the lot of the majority, nor has free trade created more jobs.
Imported goods that flooded the Mexican market in the 1990s undermined local
producers and businesses, and the displacement forced 600 Mexican enterprises to
close down in 1991 alone. Because of the economic crisis and the competition with
foreign firms and goods, 2,000,000 Mexican jobs have been lost (Hansen-Kuhn 1997).
As small businesses shut down, 200,000 to 300,000 people are annually at risk of losing
their employment (Becerril 1997).
NAFTA, a key agent in promoting globalization of the sugar industry, integrates
sugar production into the global market in consequential ways. Below, I contrast
production and trade in sugar and alternative sweeteners in the U.S. and in Mexico to
demonstrate that Mexico's integration into the global market, together with
privatization of the industry, constitutes a determinant factor that threatens the
livelihoods of unprecedented numbers of growers and workers, whom the planners of
the new economic order have chosen to marginalize.
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Sugar production in the U.S. relies on 557,000 ha of sugar beets and 294,000 ha of
cane, or a total of 851,000 ha; in Mexico, 582,746 ha of cane were under cultivation in
1996-97. However, in contrast to Mexico's more labor-intensive production in 60
sugar-producing zones, the U.S. concentrates its capital-intensive sugar industry in 12
sugar mills. U.S. sugarcane and sugarbeet growers control large expanses of land (an
average of 100-150 ha in Louisiana and Texas, and 11,000 ha in Hawaii and Florida),
while Mexican cane growers average 3.5 ha on ejido (agrarian reform land),5 and 12 ha
on private landholdings (Buzzanell & Lord 1993). Labor constitutes a key difference
between sugar production in the U.S. and Mexico. In Mexico, 145,145 cane growers
and 264,411 workers directly depend on the sugar industry, and the sector indirectly
supports 2,424,969 individuals (interview, CNIAA [Cámara Nacional de las Industrias
Azucarera y Alcoholera] 1998). Labor in rural Mexico in 1997 averaged $30 pesos (U.S.
$4) per day, yet thousands depend on labor in the cane fields for their economic
survival. Indeed, sugar production is a social imperative in the employment of vast
numbers of Mexicans. These data must be borne in mind when considering the
differential effects of globalization on the economy: few of the extremely wealthy
sugar industrialists in the U.S. are affected, while thousands of Mexicans, representing
a range of social classes, who depend on the sugar industry for their survival,
experience the impact.
The entry of new entrepreneurial groups into sugar production coincides with the
linkages of these groups to increasingly vulnerable export markets (Carton de
Grammont 1995). Under NAFTA, Mexico can export up to 25,000 tons of sugar to the
U.S. (0.0055% of its national production) in the first six years (1994-2000); after year
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seven (2001), it may export up to 250,000 tons. NAFTA provided that, if Mexico
acquired surplus producer status for two consecutive years after year six, it could then
export all of its surplus, duty-free, to the U.S. A closer look at sugar and sweetener
production in the two countries reveals, however, the unbalanced playing field
established by NAFTA.
U.S. cane and sugarbeet growers formed a formidable and powerful lobby that
exerted extensive pressure on U.S. policy before the passage of NAFTA in 1994. These
growers enjoyed substantial price supports (via the Food Security Act of 1985), which
afforded them lucrative profits. The fear that Mexico would switch to high fructose
corn syrup (HFCS) in its soft drink industry and export its surplus sugar, thus
depressing U.S. sugar prices, led sugar producers in the U.S. to oppose NAFTA.
Under pressure from sugarbeet growers, last minute modifications were made to the
NAFTA agreement that provided U.S. sugar growers a decided advantage over
Mexican cane growers. These modifications required that Mexico's exportable surplus
of sugar must exceed its consumption of cane sugar and high fructose corn syrup
(Butler & Otero 1995).
High fructose corn syrup (HFCS) has come to symbolize a war of sweeteners being
waged within the parameters of NAFTA. The competition of HFCS with cane sugar
signals significant transformations in global production and marketing, wherein
synthetics replace traditional products (Rubio 1995), heighten inequalities between the
U.S. and Mexico, and contribute to the exclusion of low-income cane growers. The
exclusion of the latter is assured as competition with HFCS forces the least productive
mills to close their doors. The United States led the way in the substitution of HFCS
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for domestic sugar and in recent years promoted HFCS as a sugar substitute in Mexico.
As subsidized, low-priced corn and technological advancements allowed the fructose
industry to expand, faced with contraction of demand for sugar, "The United States
entirely shielded domestic sugar producers from this decline in market share to HFCS
by imposing a quota on sugar imports" (Buzzanell & Lord 1993:1). As a result, U.S.
sugar imports fell from five million tons in the 1970s to between one and two million in
the late 1980s, just as Mexico was regaining its sugar export capacity.
The Mexican sugar industry was affected not only by contractions in U.S. sugar
imports, but by declining sugar demand within Mexico. Industrial sugar
consumption, a mere 762,386 tons in 1970, had reached 2,534,929 tons by 1995; in 1991,
soft drinks alone accounted for 1,300,000 tons of sugar per year, or 55 percent of
industrial sugar consumption in Mexico (Buzzanell & Lord 1993, García Chávez 1997).
Mexico consumed 3,950,000 tons of sugar in 1998 and exported 1,265,000 tons,
according to the CNIAA. Just as production reached a historical benchmark of
5,174,028 tons in 1998, though, domestic sugar consumption contracted in response to
its displacement by HFCS.
The potential benefits to Mexico from global market integration stand to be
undermined by the very competitive U.S.-dominated fructose industry. While Mexico
removed price supports and subsidies from Mexican corn growers, the balance was
tipped in favor of U.S. corn growers, who receive substantial subsidies for corn, from
which fructose is derived. In 1992, the U.S. exported 20,000 tons of HFCS to Mexico
(Kessel et al. 1993); this amount increased to 350,000 tons in 1997 (Muñoz 1997). Data
on the import of HFCS, provided by CNIAA, indicate the rapidity with which sugar is
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being replaced by HFCS in Mexico.
Imported HFCS has displaced 932,000 tons of Mexican sugar since 1992 and
350,000 tons in 1997 alone (see Table 2). In addition, an industry official predicted
imports of 400,000 tons in 1998. The relatively low price of HFCS (23-30% percent
below the price of sugar) and a decline in the Mexican tariff under NAFTA will further
escalate U.S. exports of HFCS to Mexico. The USDA (United States Department of
Agriculture) projects U.S. exports of 500,000 metric tons of HFCS by the year 2000 and,
by 2008, these exports are expected to capture 90 percent of the soft drink market and
37 percent of the total sweetener market in Mexico (Cruz 1997, Kessel et al. 1993,
Rudiño 1998b).
In February 1997, a bitter conflict between the U.S. and Mexico emerged when
Mexico initiated an antidumping investigation and raised tariffs on HFCS imported
from the U.S. Moreover, Mexican sugar industrialists and soft drink companies in
Mexico reached an accord to limit the use of HFCS to 380,000 tons over the next three
years. This agreement committed the Mexican bottling industry, which consumes
900,000 tons of sweeteners annually--20 to 50 percent of which is fructose--to meet any
increase in demand with sugar, rather than HFCS (Flores 1997; Rudiño 1997). The U.S.
Senate Agricultural Committee accused the Mexican government of coercive and
illegal actions against Mexican soft drink corporations, many of which have franchises
with U.S. soft drink brands, for limiting the purchase of foreign HFCS. The matter was
subsequently brought before the World Trade Organization for violation of the
principles of NAFTA. A letter to Mexican ambassador Jesús Silva Herzog from the
president of the Byproducts Subcommittee on General Form Commodities of the U.S.

13

House Committee on Agriculture further sharpened the conflict (González 1997:27):
The establishment of limits sanctioned by the government would promote
protectionism that NAFTA has sought to eliminate....I, therefore, respectfully
request that the Government of Mexico supply a witness for this hearing who
can explain the decisions between Mexican officials and the soft drink
industry.
Perceptions of this unequal relationship radically differ south of the border. An
interview with a representative of the Mexican national cane growers' union (UNPCA)
in 1997 captured this critique of the unequal trade relationship:
The U.S. imports 4,200,000 tons of sugar but purchases only 25,000 tons from
Mexico. With the agreement we made with the industrialists, no more than
380,000 tons of HFCS can be sold in Mexico. Whereas sugar is the survival of
the cane grower, high fructose corn syrup is death for us. We intend to
confront NAFTA. We are not going to allow one sugar mill to close. We
cannot let the people die; it is necessary to defend them. This is the only
industry that employs so many people in the rural sector. We are trying to
protect the work of 2,000,000 cane growers. If we leave so many people
without employment, where are they going to work? When a sugar mill
closes, everything ends. When a sugar mill goes under, the community goes
under. This is the oldest industry, with a history of 400 years. Never in the
history of this country has it been as threatened as now.
In September 1998, Mexico's Secretary of Commerce (SECOFI) demanded that the
United States allow Mexico to export an amount of sugar equivalent to the amount of
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HFCS that the United States exports to Mexico and imposed new tariffs on fructose
imports. Two transnationals, Archer Daniels Midland and A.E. Staley Manufacturing,
had begun to export Grade-90 for the purpose of mixing it with the cheaper Mexican
Grade-44 to avoid paying recently-imposed tariffs for Grade-55 fructose. SECOFI
assigned tariffs to each corporation of U.S. $55.37 and $90.26 per ton, respectively,
drawing sharp criticism from the U.S. Corn Refiners' Association (Latin American
Institute 1998).
NAFTA epitomizes the neoliberal project for market opening and fortifies the
process of globalization. The social costs of economic advantage in a globalized
market that articulates countries in inequitable relations portend further
marginalization. The gravity of this problem lies in the fact that excessive imports of
HFCS from the U.S. threaten to close 22 of Mexico's 60 sugar mills, leaving 150,000
persons unemployed (Rudiño 1998a). The USDA predicted that rationalization of
production would eliminate 40 of Mexico's sugar mills by the year 2000 (Kessel et al.
1993). The severity of the issue waxes clear in the closure of the Rosales, Sinaloa, mill
in 1997. The corporate owner, Juan Gallardo Thurlow (a key Mexican actor in the
NAFTA negotiations and owner of seven sugar mills), chose to close Ingenio Rosales in
a strategy of consolidation. While U.S. producers stand to gain, the cost in mill
closures and loss of jobs in Mexico is estimated at U.S. $6,000,000,000 (Cruz 1997). This
is the context of international conflict within which the community of Puruarán is
embedded.
THE PURUARAN SUGAR MILL
Alberto Santos de Hoyos purchased the Puruarán sugar mill in 1991; of the four
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refineries in the sale package, Puruarán and Pedernales were the least productive.
Accordingly, at the end of the first harvest season, Santos closed the Puruarán mill,
claiming that it was unprofitable. This rationalization of production, as the case of
Puruarán makes clear, remains blind to the socioeconomic, cultural, and political costs
to local residents. The closure of this mill stifled economic activity throughout the
region; unemployment, malnutrition, school dropouts, business failures, and outmigration played havoc in a community formerly knit by cultural traditions extending
back to the colonial period.
My intent in this paper is to take into account an alternative analysis to the macrolevel interpretation, one grounded in cultural, economic, and political dimensions of
neoliberal transformation at the local level. As Sánchez Gómez's (1995) research in
Oaxaca demonstrates, rural communities depend on agriculture not only as a survival
strategy, but as an important component of cultural identity. This historical
dependency on agriculture determines their way of life, yet is becoming increasingly
difficult to sustain. Likewise, in Puruarán, the abrupt termination of traditional forms
of economic activity thrust upon the community a severe crisis of social reproduction.
The saliency of a cultura cañera (cane culture) in this cane-producing zone formed the
basis for a struggle to illegally reopen the Puruarán mill and to sustain traditional
forms of community life. Individual strategies, however, took multiple forms,
including resistance through participation in the social movement to reopen the mill,
accommodation through alternative means of employment, out-migration, and
violence. These strategies suggest diverse responses to the meanings attached to local
space.
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The Meaning of Local Space
The community of Puruarán had depended on cane and sugar production since
the founding of its hacienda in 1772. By the 19th century, there were eight sugarproducing haciendas in the region (Landázuri & Vázquez 1988). The sugar mill passed
through a series of owners in the 1930s, eventually coming into the hands of an
American, Thomas D. Boyd. When the mill went bankrupt in 1966, the National Ejidal
Credit Bank took it over, although the property remained in the name of Boyd.
During field research, residents of Puruarán frequently recounted events indelibly
inscribed in historical memory by a 300-year tradition that gave shape to local culture.
Many individuals referred to a plaque in the mill, dated January 31, 1966, that
documents the historic event when President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, along with officials
of the Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal, rehabilitated the mill "in benefit of the
ejidatarios and inhabitants of the region." Residents consider the mill, designated by
the bank as "Ingenio Ejidal, Puruarán," property of the community, and they contest
the legitimacy of its sale to Santos de Hoyos, who paid only 7.8 percent of the refinery's
total value of 54,000,000 old pesos.6 According to local ideology, Santos received the
mill as a virtual gift for his support to Carlos Salinas de Gortari in the 1988 presidential
elections.
When neoliberal policies called for privatization of Mexico's sugar industry, the
CNPP (Confederación Nacional de Pequeños Propietarios, now the CNPR) paid 15
percent down on four mills that they intended to purchase--Alianza Popular, Bella
Vista, Pedernales, and Puruarán. The purchase agreement gave the growers' union 49
percent ownership and Empresas Gamesa, then owned by Santos, 51 percent.
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However, neoliberal policy did not favor producer ownership of mills, and the
national leadership of the CNPP was pressured to cede full ownership of the mills to
Santos, who closed the Puruarán mill, on May 25, 1992.

The rationale for closing

"inefficient" sugar mills and subjecting thousands of residents of this region to
unemployment can be measured against data that reveal the place of Ingenio Puruarán
among other mills in the country. In 1991, Puruarán had 2,062 ha of cane in
cultivation, industrialized 158,498 tons of cane, and produced 15,400 tons of sugar. In
terms of sugar volume, Puruarán was the fifth smallest refinery in the country. In
1992, the year the mill closed, the average yield in tons of cane per hectare at Puruarán
was 91.63, in contrast to the national average of 74.34; only 14 of Mexico's 62 mills
surpassed Puruarán's yields, and 48 had lower averages. While the factory yield (tons
of sugar produced per ton of cane) at Puruarán was 9.70, the national average was 9.28;
only 18 mills surpassed Puruarán, and 44 achieved lower factory yields. Also,
extraction of sucrose during the processing of cane at Puruarán was 13.01 percent in
1992, while the national average was 12.36 percent; Puruarán was ranked twelfth in the
nation (CNIAA 1995). Santos' other mills surpassed Puruarán in volume, yet Puruarán
ranked relatively high in measures of efficiency.
Perhaps more revealing is the fact that sugar mills in Mexico were notorious for
overemployment that taxed their profitability. Representatives from the national
syndicate had warned workers at Puruarán that, if the mill did not lay off workers, it
would be closed. One ex-worker recalled, "We did not want to leave--we said 'all' or
'none.' Well, one is ignorant, right? Because we did not know what agreements they
had made. We said, 'If you are going to hang some, hang everyone'" (fieldnotes, 1997).
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Workers at Santos' Pedernales mill, 11 km away, were willing to accept worker layoffs,
which served as a justification for keeping it open. Puruarán, on the other hand, is a
substantially larger community with an infrastructure that supports a larger number of
people.
Community infrastructure and housing at Puruarán bespeak of past wealth
derived from the sugar refinery. The cash flow owing to payment to workers, truck
drivers, cane cutters, and others was $3-4 million pesos per week. Unlike many other
rural Mexican communities where one encounters tarpaper houses and dirt floors,
most houses in Puruarán are spacious and well-built, with cement walls, tiled roofs,
and ceramic tile floors. The economic vitality of the past is apparent in public
infrastructure--the attractive building housing government offices, numerous
businesses that made up an active and lively commercial center, and the opulence of
the community's cathedral, with its tiled exterior walls and religious murals.
These remnants of past prosperity camouflage the present reality of economic
devastation inflicted upon this community by free market neoliberalism. Many of the
young people have left, while the elderly remain trapped, without economic
alternatives. In contrast to many Mexican villages, there are no houses under
construction--evidence of U.S. dollars sent to improve lifestyle. Here, remittances are
used for mere survival. The current situation is clear in the extraordinary number of
homes with se vende (for sale) painted on their exteriors. Puruarán is not a community
that has always been poor; the poverty being experienced today subjects people to a
pernicious form of relative deprivation.
A Social Movement in Search of Social Justice
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The consequences of globalization for the community of Puruarán form a context
in which local residents contested, in diverse ways, their inability to reproduce family
and community forms of survival. Within this arena of global-local articulation, the
community of Puruarán illustrates the strategies chosen by its residents to confront the
globalization of local space. Below I explain how marginalization was experienced in
this community and how it formed the basis for the emergence of a new social
movement that asserted local power in demand of social justice.
On December 7, 1992, community residents mobilized across class and
occupational lines and illegally seized the abandoned sugar refinery. Under the
leadership of Gregorio Alvarez Vargas, cane growers, mill workers, and townspeople
surrounded the mill, entered through an open window, and removed six guards
placed there by the owner. The seizure revealed the power of an ideology based on the
significance of local cultural space and community identity, as it materialized in a
strategy to preserve traditional forms of family and community life. This action
brought Puruarán residents into direct conflict with the mill owner and the
government as they challenged the hegemony of national and regional political forces
at the local level. The issue became politicized on two levels. First, the mill owner,
with substantial power as a federal senator and as newly-elected president of the
CNIAA, was able to use his influence within these two organizations to shape
government response to the community's struggle for justice. Second, although he is
not a resident of the state of Michoacán, as owner of the nearby Pedernales mill, Santos
effectively implements mill policy through the current Pedernales mill manager, and
also wields influence over the governor of Michoacán. Those involved in the social
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movement to reopen the mill have thus seen their demands weakened when they took
their petitions to the state government and to national government officials.
After the seizure of the Puruarán mill, 180 workers volunteered their labor to
repair the factory and put it back in operation. An illegal harvest, known locally as the
"miniharvest," was carried out from March through May 1993. Mill workers, without
the aid of engineers, chemists, and other technicians, processed 36,000 tons cane
(almost one-fourth of the cane in the zone) into 3,300 tons of sugar, valued at 700,000
pesos (U.S. $93,333) and made partial payments to some 500-700 cane growers. Mill
workers, referring to the ceiling-high stacks of sugar in the warehouse, exclaimed, "We
ignorant ones produced all this." (The comment was in reference to the label "ignorant"
used by Santos to describe workers involved in the seizure.) Nonetheless, the owner
denied them the right to sell the sugar, since the mill had been illegally possessed.
Santos contacted the state governor, who ordered state and anti-riot police to
arrest the leaders of the movement; three of these leaders had been fired on by hired
gunmen before the mill seizure. Seven men were taken from their homes at gunpoint,
in their calzoncillos (underwear), and incarcerated; the police showed no order for
search and arrest. They were released after 20 days, on bail of 1000 pesos each, but
were required to sign in on a weekly basis--like criminals on parole, for four years. A
detainee who suffered diabetes and heart problems died before being released from his
parole obligations. He had migrated with his family to Veracruz, but returned to
Puruarán to engage in the struggle to reopen the mill. Another of the detainees later
related: "We did not rob, we did not kill, we did not take anyone's property away from
them. The crime was to work. That was the crime. The crime was to work, that is why
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they jailed us" (fieldnotes, 1997).
On the day of the arrests, July 3, 1993, the town was besieged by 150-200 state and
federal police. They arrived in Puruarán at 5:00 AM in 30 Suburban station wagons
and pickups, three anti-riot trucks, and two fire trucks, and began to dismantle the
sugar mill. As the church bells tolled, townspeople united in a demonstration and
prohibited the police from removing additional mill equipment. Subsequently, 60
"Azules," or preventative police, arrived to guard the mill, from 1993 to 1996. While it
was under their "protection," the Azules dismantled and destroyed machinery, cut
cables, broke windows, and fired numerous rifle shots through the roof. According to
residents, the police destroyed the mill because they knew the people would try to
operate it again if it were left intact. This intimidation did not terminate the
community's struggle, however.
The leader of the movement, Gregorio Alvarez, escaped after absconding with
much of the profit from the illegal miniharvest. His actions initiated a series of
divisions within the social movement and left residents disillusioned and mistrustful.
A struggle for control of the movement ensued. As community tensions increased, the
comisariado ejidal (president of the ejido) was killed--some claimed, by his opponent,
Gregorio Alvarez. Subsequently, in September 1996, Alvarez was himself the victim of
an assassin's bullet. In a context of escalating violence, 15 individuals were killed in a
three-year period over conflicts related to the sugar mill. The former unity has not
been regained as new groups have emerged to take control of the social movement.
Puruarán's priest assumed leadership of the movement in 1995, at the insistence of
500-600 ex-mill workers, cane growers, taxi drivers, teachers, merchants, housewives,
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and other residents attending a community meeting. The priest agreed to do so, on
condition that there be no violence and that the struggle be waged through legal
means. He explained to me why he, a priest, would become involved in such a
struggle:
First, you have to fill the stomachs of the people, before talking to them about
God. If they are hungry, how am I going to speak of this? Then, I am
sensitive to the needs of the people; if I can help them to procure employment,
I will help them. This is not so I can gain glory, but for the satisfaction that I
have in being able to open doors.
The Committee for the Struggle to Reopen Ingenio Puruarán formed under his
leadership and began a three-year legal campaign to oblige the government to
intervene on behalf of the community. The Committee presented petitions for
expropriation of the mill to the governor, state officials, national officials, and
President Zedillo. The Committee based its demand for expropriation on alleged
violations of the sale contract. Clause 8 obligates purchasers of Mexican sugar mills to
maintain their factories as sources of employment and to improve their productive
capacities. Furthermore, this clause requires purchasers to "foment modernization,
rehabilitation, diversification, integration, and agricultural development."
In 1995, the Committee met with Santos de Hoyos and government officials and
proposed three alternatives to Santos: (1) that he sell or rent the mill to the community,
(2) that he remain owner but let the community operate the mill, or (3) that he reopen
the mill and operate it himself. Santos' response illustrates the exclusionary character
of the current development trend and its inability to address the social injustices
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suffered by those who are marginalized: "The social aspect, the development, to
remove so many people of the region from poverty, this is not my responsibility. As a
businessman, it has to be a business that gives me earnings."
Failing to achieve a favorable response, in 1996 townspeople again took over the
Puruarán mill and forced the police guards to leave. An agreement was reached with
the state government allowing community residents to guard the mill, and 30
individuals continued to work rotating shifts to guard it against further destruction.
Ultimately, Santos demanded that the mill be returned to him and threatened to close
the nearby Pedernales mill, as well, if it were not returned.
In 1996, the Committee began to work with the Michoacán government to
establish small factories as alternate sources of employment, none of which
materialized. This effort entailed a strategy of accommodation that turned much of the
population against the Committee, with accusations that Committee members were no
longer interested in reopening the sugar mill. The movement fractured once more
with challenges that the priest's Committee had been sold to the government and that
its leaders became involved in the movement only to secure support for political
positions within the ruling party, PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional). The
president of the Committee, one of three elected leaders, ran for Presidente Municipal
on the PRI ticket in 1998.
A new faction emerged in 1998 under the leadership of Pedro Tapia (pseudonym),
a former mill accountant. Tapia formed the Sociedad Cooperativa Lázaro Cárdenas
del Río, comprised of loyal PRDistas, some of whom also aspired to local offices in the
1998 elections. At the national level, the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Democrática) is
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the left-of-center opposition party that seriously challenged the government's ruling
PRI party in the 1988 presidential elections. Although Carlos Salinas de Gortari was
"officially" declared winner, it was widely recognized that election fraud prevented
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the PRD candidate, from winning. While the PRI has won
every presidential election since 1917, the PRD, along with other oppositional parties,
has taken a more active role in national and local politics recent years.
Political opening, characterized by participation of opposition parties within the
past decade, further disunited the movement in Puruarán. The accountant's faction
found fertile soil for taking action and gaining support, owing to the inability of the
official Committee, now derogatorily referred to as PRIistas, to achieve results. Tapia's
faction forced the Committee's guards out of the mill on April 20, 1998, and initiated a
second illegal operation of the mill, with poor results. Owing to mechanical failures,
they processed only 20 tons of sugar from 5,000 tons of cane delivered by loyal cane
growers.
Strangely, the owner and state authorities did not intervene in the 1998 operation,
but growers who delivered cane to Puruarán were denied further credit at Ingenio
Pedernales, and workers who helped with repairs to the mill were dismissed from
employment in the construction of irrigation canals--the most important, if temporary,
alternative source of employment since the mill closure. The canal project extended
the irrigation infrastructure for cane lands in the zone of Santos' Pedernales mill and
was financially supported by the state government. Growers who delivered cane to
Santos' Pedernales refinery in 1998 suffered different consequences. The Pedernales
mill still had 60 percent of its sugar stockpiled in the warehouse in September 1998,
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owing to the displacement of sugar by HFCS. As a consequence, Pedernales, along
with other mills in the country, was left with insufficient cash flow to make payments
to cane growers. Between August 9 and August 25, 1998, lists were posted on the door
of the casa ejidal (ejido office) advising growers when they would be paid for their cane.
People lined up daily to check the lists, and desperation mounted, since over two-andone-half months had passed since the end of the harvest, well beyond the legallyspecified 30 day limit for making payment to growers.
Tapia's faction quickly lost most of its support after he sold the sugar and syrup
stored since the 1993 miniharvest, then claimed that he had no money to pay growers
or mill workers, who had labored for months without pay. Accusations that Tapia was
pocketing money from the sale of sugar, that opponents had sabotaged the mill, that
cash donations contributed to the movement by local politicians and Puruarán
migrants in the U.S. had been confiscated by the priest's group, and that the Committee
had "sold out" to the government were rife in the community. Yet, the desire to reopen
the mill rivals the force of increasing factionalism. Antonio revealed the greater
common aim of most community residents--to get the mill reopened:
Well, there were certain things about the priest's Committee that we did not
like, but we are in the same boat. Thus, if they get it opened, well fine. And if
Pedro achieves it, good, or another group, good. Here, if the virgin opens it, if
the Señor San José [the village patron saint] opens it, [what matters is] that it
gets opened.
While political will to reopen the mill is strong among all residents of Puruarán,
the sharp factions that divide the community and that foster paranoic mistrust among
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neighbors and even within families pose a formidable barrier that must be
transcended.
THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF MILL CLOSURE
Phillips (1998) suggests that the gap between neoliberal rhetoric and the realities
associated with neoliberal reforms obscure the worsened conditions for livelihood,
health and economic and social well-being borne by those who are marginalized. The
closure of Ingenio Puruarán provides an empirical case study to examine the impact of
neoliberal policy on local residents and to give voice to local actors who may share an
alternative view of the neoliberal agenda. Taking account of the global-local nexus
within which local actors confront the challenges posed by a globalized, market-driven
world clarifies the need to prioritize social justice as a crucial element of economic
policy.
Local Discourse and the Ideology of Social Justice
Field research based on formal and informal interviews with people from all walks
of life in Puruarán--cane growers, ex-mill workers, teachers, small business owners,
and service providers--bears witness to the startling assault on social justice caused by
the mill closure. No individual escaped its impact. Owing to the lack of alternative
sources of employment, the majority of citizens were left with extremely limited
incomes. Economically, loss of income affects access to housing, food, clothing, and
medical care. Nutritional deficiencies are common. Lack of clients and cash flow have
challenged the ability of local businesses to stay afloat. In a community that sent many
of its children on to higher education, school enrollments declined dramatically.
Socially, Puruarán's residents experience profound distress, mixed with rage. Many
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turned to robbing, alcoholism, narcotrafficking, and violence when no other solution
materialized.
Since the mill closure, residents of Puruarán have constructed a shared ideology of
social justice that communicates their outrage through forms of local discourse.
Concern with preservation of their families, their community, and the right to work
punctuate everyday conversations. Perceptively attuned to the needs of the
community, the parish priest confided:
I arrived when it was very critical, after they closed the mill. You can still see
the great poverty because many jobs were lost. The pay from the mill that
was received in all the region, all this brought people for commerce--the
commerce was lively. [Today] the stores are barely surviving. Many [of
them] closed and many ex-workers had to leave Puruarán; they had to
migrate. This was a consequence of the closing. The first six months after I
arrived, pickups with high-powered weapons passed, firing at all hours. The
people, at six in the afternoon, no longer left their houses. I believe that, for
lack of employment and with the crisis here, it provoked peoples' nerves.
Many young boys have been killed by police while robbing in the streets.
How many have been killed? Well, we have lost count. Here we say that,
when 15 days pass without an assassination, it is a long time. The region is
violent, but the violence has increased because of the unemployment and the
crisis. And the violence continues.
This reality contrasts sharply with local historical memory. A salient factor giving
form to community life in Puruarán is its historical legacy of cane and sugar
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production. Humberto (pseudonym) is an 82-year-old cane grower whose father had
worked at the Puruarán mill and labored in the cane fields. When Humberto was a
child, his family lived in a house with cornstalk walls, a woven thatched roof, and a
dirt floor, yet the family of five survived on his father's income. Humberto began to
labor in the fields at age 12, when his father taught him to cultivate cane. In 1938,
President Lázaro Cárdenas distributed land to campesinos (peasants) and Humberto
received his ejido parcel of two hectares. All of Humberto's seven children are cane
growers. As in most families in Puruarán, the tradition of working in the cane or the
mill spans many generations. Humberto assessed the mill closure: "We don't have any
other industry except the cane. As long as I remember, this had been the only industry
here. Now we have no money. From where?"
Many cane growers now deliver their cane to Santos' Pedernales mill, 11 km from
Puruarán. Out of the 1140 cane growers who delivered cane to the Puruarán mill in
1991, 844 (74%), delivered to Pedernales in 1998. (These data do not include growers
from surrounding communities.) Most growers shared a resentment that they must
now deliver outside of their zone, owing to greater transportation costs and difficulty
in getting their cane processed at Pedernales.
Humberto, whose highest profits at Puruarán were 8,000,000 pesos (U.S. $2567),
was obliged to contract with the Pedernales mill in 1993. He earned no profit for three
years, until 1996, when he earned 1000 pesos (U.S. $135). In his words, "The cane
growers are sweating so that others can benefit. The mill owners are enjoying their life
and the poor cane grower is suffering."
Rogelio (pseudonym), another cane grower, received a profit of 5,000,000 pesos
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(U.S. $1605) at Puruarán; after he contracted with Pedernales, his cane was burned in
preparation for cutting, but never harvested because Pedernales was unable to mill all
the cane in the two zones. Nonetheless, Rogelio still owed the mill 9,000,000 pesos for
production costs, which are customarily extended in credit to the grower and charged
against his or her account. Pedernales denied him credit the following year and he
quit cane production. No longer a contracted cane grower, he lost his access to health
insurance and retirement benefits that are available only through the sugar mill.
Subsequently, the Pedernales mill attempted to rent his land; rather than rent to the
mill, he rents out his land for pasture, providing him an income of 1,000 pesos (U.S.
$135) per year. He complained, "And now, all this land is vacant because many don't
want to work with those who rob them. The cane is going to disappear because we
don't want to be obligated to Pedernales. There are so many people that worked in
vain."
Unlike cane growers, mill workers faced certain unemployment. Antonio
(pseudonym), a boiler mechanic at Ingenio Puruarán for 47 years, illustrates how
strong community ties and dedication to hard work shape local discourse and create
an ideology of social justice. He explained his involvement in the mill seizure:
I did not think just of Antonio. I was thinking about my community, that the
government was going to leave it a pure ghost town, without employment,
without this source of work. Because if you had seen how in the mill all the
people were active, the extensive activity, and it made a lot of money flow-then it ended and look how we are. Never was it like this when we had the
mill. Here, we are not educated people, we are working people. Our goal is
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to open the Puruarán mill. We are struggling only so we can work, that is all.
What interests me is that the young people have work. It would take them
out of the streets if they could dedicate themselves to work. We are working
people and we demonstrated that with the miniharvest that we made,
without even one engineer, with no one else but the workers. And we
produced sugar and we are not afraid to present it before any sugar mill that
has all its engineers, all its technicians.
Rural workers who were neither cane growers nor mill workers were also affected
by the closing of Ingenio Puruarán. Lucio (pseudonym) explained why he was helping
the ex-workers who were guarding the mill, even though he was neither a cane grower
nor a mill worker:
Look, how good that you ask me that question. I am here giving support to
this town because I live here and from the work in this town I maintained
myself. For this, I say that each and every one of us resents it, since the
moment that they closed our source of work, because it is the only thing we
had to maintain ourselves and our children. For that I am here and I am
giving the little bit of service that I can. I have been a campesino all my life. I
cut cane and whatever work there was to do. My sons also depended on this
source of work. Now, I have no work. I have looked, but there isn't any. The
people here in Puruarán need this source of work so they can survive. If our
government doesn't reopen our source of work, how are we going to live? We
have to rob or we have to plant other things, like marijuana. That is what our
government is pushing us to do. We are not to blame, if suddenly we have to
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rob because we are hungry.
Lucio's words illustrate the outrage and will to struggle that symbolize an
ideology of social justice, which Lucio shares with many others. He also demonstrates
how the social construction of historical memory confers ownership of the mill upon
the community:
Look, I want you to understand that this mill, as I understand it, has never
been sold. Never. We are sure that this mill has not been sold--for this we are
struggling. We need our source of employment reopened to give life again.
They closed this mill only on the whim of a single person. How many
thousands of people are suffering here? Imagine, because of the whim of a
single person, how many people are suffering here!
One of the most striking results of the mill closure is the pervasive manner in
which it affected all residents, even those with no direct relationship to the mill.
Interviews with owners of small businesses--restaurants, clothing stores, groceries,
pharmacies, butcher shops, market stalls--and with teachers, doctors, and others made
clear that most were on the brink of bankruptcy, having lost an average of 30 percent
of their incomes.
A restaurant owner reflected on how the mill closing had affected his business:
"The sugar mill has always been the source of work here. Before, on Fridays--payday-the restaurant was filled, and now [sweeping his hand about the room, pointing to a
single customer], it is empty. Well, it is very hard to keep going." When the mill was
opened he earned, an average of 300 pesos (U.S. $40) per day, and now his earnings
have dropped to 100-130 pesos. "In that time, on Sundays, the people formed a line all
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the way down the stairway, waiting for a table. Now there is no way to maintain
oneself." Before 1992, the restaurateur employed five people, and now he runs the
business with only one employee. "What more can I do for the workers? Well, there is
no way." Clearly, apart from the direct impact on individual families, the mill closing
further diminished the ability of local residents to maintain sources of employment
outside of the mill and to generate employment for others in the community.
The owner of a clothing store complained, "Yes, you can see that [the mill closing]
affected us because the sales are not the same. Before, I bought merchandise with cash
and now it is on pure credit." She manages two large account books in which she
keeps records of those who buy on credit; she says that, previously, most people
bought merchandise with cash. "Before, in one day I would sell 12 dresses, and now,
one dress. People always came to buy on Sundays. Now that school is starting, they
buy on pure credit. Also, I am risking because many don't pay me back." Before the
mill closed, she sold about 5000 pesos (U.S. $670) of clothing per week (before
discounting her costs) and now averages 3000 (U.S. $400)--a drop of 40 percent. Both
she and her husband operate this store, the only source of income for her family of
seven. "There are many costs and we no longer eat the same," she added.
These are but two of many businesses studied, all of which reveal a common
pattern--economic decline from the loss of wages among residents of the community.
Another notable problem in the community is the inability of many children to attend
school. The largest of four primary schools in Puruarán enrolled 480 students in 1997,
whereas average enrollment before the mill closure was 700. The director of one of the
two middle schools spoke of the consequences that the mill closing held for education.
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In 1997, there were 14 groups of students with 30 students per group (420 students
total); before the mill closed, there were 15 groups of 40 students. These figures
represent a drop in school enrollment of 30 percent. Many families, he explained, do
not have money for school uniforms, lunches, and supplies. School desertion is also
high because many children have emigrated with their families. Before the mill
closing, the majority went on to high school, but few do so now.
Professionals, who often acquired their credentials owing to income derived from
the sugar mill, were also affected by the mill closing. They, too, retain a strong
ideological commitment to locality. A prominent dentist in Puruarán explained that
the earnings of his father, a sugarcane grower, allowed him to obtain the necessary
education for his profession. The dentist served 15-20 patients per day before the mill
closed; now, he has 5-7 per day, indicating that dental care for his patients suffered a
decline of 66 percent. Identification with his community led the dentist to become
involved in the movement; he became president of the Committee for the Struggle to
Reopen Ingenio Puruarán. He explained: "As a native of Puruarán, I have seen the
sadness [brought by] the closing of this source of employment. I was born here, I lived
here, and I grew up here. I asked myself, 'What have I done for the community?' I was
fighting with papers. [He shuffled through the stacks of papers on his desk related to
the Committee's struggle and written communications with outside officials.] I am
here to confront this crisis."
The crisis had a profound impact on health care in the community. A medical
doctor at the IMSS clinic estimated that about 30 percent of children in the community
suffer malnutrition. It is also important to note that only growers who deliver cane to
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the Pedernales mill are covered by health insurance; those who quit production lost
access to health benefits. Health insurance and pension funds for all mill workers
terminated when the mill closed. Declining access to health care is compounded by the
fact that many families no longer eat as well as before.
The mill closing had obvious economic repercussions on the community, but it
also brought psychological stress that translated into alcoholism and violence. These
destructive forces tore some families apart, as a former mill worker related:
Before, the people were more tranquil. We knew that on Saturday the mill
was going to pay, and there were no fights. We knew that our children would
be content. Now, there is more tension among the people; the atmosphere is
very different. You can see the worry lines on the faces, in the faces of the
adults. They are very tense and there are no smiles. Many times they drink
alcohol, and do you know why? To forget. The people have become
alcoholic, and they fight. Do you know why the people fight? Because they
have no future. They leave their families and they go to the U.S., and that is
what brings the alcoholism. The family disintegrates, they go, and they
hardly return. The people are not bad. What is bad is that the mill closed. If
this mill were to work, the people would not leave. There are people from
Puruarán in Washington, they are in Oregon and California.
One of the most notable results of shutting down the sugar mill is that it forced
many families to uproot themselves, often to enter the U.S. illegally. The population of
Puruarán declined 16.6 percent, from 13,638 in 1987 to 11,373 in 1996, suggesting a high
degree of out-migration. Much of the population now survives on pensions and on
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remittances from the U.S. Paradoxically, just when U.S. immigration policy tightens
the border, current international and Mexican policies precipitate factory closures that
augment this out-migration. Migration is not undertaken lightly, for residents of
Puruarán are acutely aware of the risks. People frequently reported that migrants
were robbed by coyotes (individuals paid to assist with illegal border crossings) and left
destitute. A 1997 report from a Michoacán newspaper was not uncommon: 17 bodies
of dead immigrants were returned to Michoacán in 1996, and the body count rose to 49
the following year (Gurza 1997).
The Symbolism of Resistance
The entire community of Puruarán immersed itself in a remarkable struggle to
reopen its primary source of employment and to confront the hegemonic powers that
had challenged the social reproduction of community life. In the process, local identity
was reaffirmed and expressed through a symbolism of resistance. This symbolism
represented not only the social reconstruction of community identity but also, as
suggested by Hernández and Nigh (1995), materialized in counter-production defined
through political struggle.
The symbolism of resistance to globalizing forces experienced among community
members unfurls itself in a spectacular display of public artwork. A block-long wall
adjoining the sugar refinery uses the medium of a vividly-colored mural with poignant
discourse of resistance to call attention to the community's struggle to reopen the mill
and preserve the community (see Figure 2). The artwork on this wall portrays the
people raising clenched fists, accompanied by the words, "We will conquer" (see Figure
3). It displays portraits of Subcomandante Marcos (the leader of the Zapatista rebellion
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in Chiapas state), Emiliano Zapata (the land-reform hero of the 1910 Mexican
Revolution; see Figure 4), and Che Guevara (hero of the Cuban revolution; see Figure
5), exemplifying the community's appropriation of and identification with these
revolutionary heroes. Augmenting the artwork, along the length of the wall, are the
protests of the people. This wall displays the disposition of the community to struggle
against all odds, as it avows, "Death to bad government," and "We struggle for liberty!
Justice! and Democracy!" Through the words of Zapata, the wall proclaims, "The land
and its product belong to those that work," and expresses the demand, "Work for all"
(see Figure 6). The affirmation, "For the people, what is of the people, and NOT for the
good of the bosses," illustrates the profound conflict between what the community
perceives as corrupt industrialists and the legitimate needs of the people (see Figure 7).
The will to preserve the community's historical legacy is symbolized in the words, "No
ambition will devour the sweetness of this town."
This wall, then, symbolizes the reality of globalization and the impact of the
neoliberal project on the community of Puruarán. The comisariado (ejido president)
used these words to explain that the discourse of struggle is not a phantom ideology:
"Puruarán is not a television show. It is a reality that should be seen but, above all, to
be able to understand that the government should attend to us, [and] if it does not do it
in time, we will all lament the consequences" (Hernández 1996:10).

An Auspicious Postscript
Recently, an auspicious event shows promise for reenergizing the local economy
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of Puruarán. Gregorio Alvarez, initial leader of the movement, was approached after
the 1993 seizure of the mill by a company interested in working with rural
cooperatives. Pascual, manufacturer of the non-cola, natural fruit drinks that sell
under the "Boing" label, offered to purchase the Puruarán refinery. The community
would form a cooperative to operate the mill and, in exchange for financing
operations, Pascual would purchase all of the sugar produced by the cooperative. As
divisions within the community increased, however, Pascual withdrew from the offer.
In August 1998, Tapia's faction visited officials of Pascual in Mexico City and reopened
dialogue. On January 28, 1999, a new agreement materialized and the Puruarán mill
once again opened its doors under contract with Pascual. Some 200 growers were
delivering their cane and mill workers were receiving their bi-weekly paychecks. Of
special interest is the fact that, as one consultant stated, "Pascual does not use one drop
of fructose." This solution provides people with work and income, and guarantees a
market for their sugar, while it contributes to the production of a healthier, non-cola
product.
CONCLUSIONS
Global competition is central to the new world economic order, a fact that is readily
apparent. As Llambí (1996) points out, though, the simultaneous transformations
taking place in rural localities may be less visible, although equally dramatic. In this
paper, I have attempted to demonstrate the dynamic interrelationship between these
global and local processes. The closing of the Puruarán, Michoacán sugar mill not only
illustrates the daunting impact of corporate consolidation and free market
neoliberalism on a rural community, but also reveals how the globalization of local
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space may foment a counter-hegemonic response in opposition to the logic of
globalized capitalism and generate new forms of social organization to counter the
consequences of social exclusion. The closing of the Puruarán sugar mill foreshadows
the social costs that would be engendered by the elimination of additional sugar mills
faced by competition in the new global marketplace.
Globalization, privatizations, and market expansion stand to replicate the social
injustices inflicted on Puruarán 20-fold, as other sugar-producing communities
succumb to economic rationalization. Yet, macro-analytic approaches seldom examine
the social costs and human suffering that accompany the ascendancy of global
competition. Concern with social justice requires an alternative focus, one that not
only takes into consideration how unequal competition, loss of work and income, and
declining standards of living are experienced by local communities, but also accounts
for emergent social movements that aim to preserve community forms of survival.
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NOTES
1. The research included communities in the provision zones of four sugar mills:
Ingenio Quesería, Colima; Ingenio San Sebastián, Ingenio Lázaro Cárdenas (Taretan),
and Ingenio Puruarán, Michoacán. "Ingenio" is the Spanish term for sugar mill.
2. Ironically, after closing the Puruarán mill and threatening to close the Pedernales
refinery, in 1997 Santos purchased three additional mills, Cuatotolápam and San
Gabriel,
both in Veracruz, and Plan de Ayala, San Luis Potosí. Plan de Ayala is the largest
producer among Santos' six mills. Since mills that are at risk of closure are those that
produce under 100,000 tons of sugar annually, only two of these--Alianza Popular and
Plan de Ayala--would seem secure from this risk.
3. In Mexico, the term "neoliberalism" connotes economic policies and practices that in
the United States would be considered conservative in nature. Based on principles of
classical economics, neoliberalism emerged in Mexico and other Latin American
countries largely in response to the "lost decade" of the 1980s, when Latin American
nations fell into the grip of national debt. Neoliberal policies that were to serve as
correctives to these faltering economies included state retraction from the economic
sphere, private investment, and free-market principles oriented toward export
production.
4. Structural adjustment involves a restructuring of the economies of debt-ridden
countries and adoption of a series of policies imposed by the IMF (International
Monetary Fund). The 1980s debt crisis that plagued many Latin American nations
instilled the fear that default on their loans would destabilize the world economic
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system. To ensure repayment of these loans to World Bank and private lending
institutions, restructuring of the debt and acquisition of new loans were contingent on
adopting economic policies and austerity measures specified by IMF. Because
government control of the economy was viewed as inefficient, private (often foreign)
investment was believed to offer greater potential for economic growth. In addition to
privatizing the economy, structural adjustment policies called for withdrawal of state
subsidies for basic goods and services, agricultural production, and social guarantees,
along with wage controls, devaluation of currencies, elimination of tariffs and trade
barriers, and the opening of markets to free trade. The loss of protections, however,
created greater hardships among the poorer sectors, as imports from the world market
competed with locally-produced goods.
5. Mexican ejidos are agrarian reform lands, comprising approximately 50% of arable
lands in Mexico. After the revolution, large, landed estates were broken up and
redistributed to petitioning rural communities. Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican
Constitution made provision for the distribution of land to peasants, which was either
worked communally, or parceled to individual members, who held usufruct rights.
The land was inalienable and could not be legally sold, although rights could be
passed to a family member through inheritance. In 1992, the Mexican Constitution was
modified, legally terminating the government's obligation to redistribute lands and
establishing the legal basis for privatization of ejido land.
6. The Mexican peso was devalued from 3116 pesos to the U.S. dollar in 1992 to 3.19 in
1993. The older value is referenced in "old pesos," while the new value is given in
"new pesos."

41

REFERENCES
Barkin, David, Irene Ortiz, and Fred Rosen (1997) "Globalization and Resistance: The
Remaking of Mexico." NACLA Report on the Americas 30(4):14-27.
Becerril, Isabel (1997) "Imparable, el cierre de pequeñas empresas: Concamin
(Unstoppable, the closure of small businesses: Concamin)." El Financiero
(newspaper), September 17, p. 39.
Butler Flora, Cornelia, and Gerardo Otero (1995) "Sweet Neighbors? The State and the
Sugar Industries in the United States and Mexico under NAFTA." Pp. 6374 in Peter Singelmann (ed.) Mexican Sugarcane Growers: Economic
Restructuring and Political Options. San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies.
Buzzanell, Peter and Ron Lord (1993) Sugar and Corn Sweetener: Changing Demand
and
Trade in Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Washington, DC:
Agriculture Information Bulletin, No. 655, Economic Research Service,
United States Department of Agriculture.
Carton de Grammont, Hubert, ed. (1995) Globalización, deterioro ambiental y
reorganización social en el campo (Globalization, Environmental
Deterioration and Social Reorganization in the Countryside). Mexico, DF:
Universidad Autónoma de México.
CNIAA [Confederación Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera] (1995)
Desarrollo Agrícola Cañero, Zafra 1989/90 - 1994/95 (Agricultural
Development of Cane, 1989/90 - 1997/95 Harvest). Mexico, DF: CNIAA.

42

Chollett, Donna L. (1994) State Divestment, Reprivatization, and Peasants: Dialectical
Transformations Within the Mexican Sugar Sector. Ph.D. dissertation,
Michigan State University.
Cruz Romero, José (1997) "El TLC-Azúcar y los sinsabores de la fructosa (The Free
Trade
Agreement--Sugar and the Trouble of Fructose)." La Jornada
(newspaper), October 1, p. 3.
García Chávez, Luis Ramiro (1997) El mercado azucarero mexicano y el tratado de libre
comercio (The Mexican Sugar Market and the Free Trade Agreement).
Chapingo, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Chapingo.
Gates, Marilyn (1993) In Default: Peasants, the Debt Crisis and the Agricultural
Challenge
in Mexico. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Gledhill, John (1995) Neoliberalism, Transnationalization and Rural Poverty: A Case
Study
of Michoacán, Mexico. Boulder: Westview Press.
González Pérez, Lourdes (1997) "Recrimina EU las restricciones a la fructosa (The U.S.
Recriminates Restrictions on Fructose)." El Financiero (newspaper),
September 9, p. 27.
Gurza, Teresa (1997) "Miles de Michoacanos Emigran a EU; Pocos Regresan Vivos
(Thousands of Michoacanos Migrate to the US; Few Return Alive)." La
Voz de Michoacán (newspaper), September 2, p. 16A.
Hansen-Kuhn, Karen (1997) "Clinton, NAFTA and the Politics of U.S. Trade." NACLA:

43

Report on the Americas 31(2):22-26.

Hernández Calderón, Gabriel (1996) "Vale más Santos de Hoyos que un pueblo con
hambre
(Santos de Hoyos is Worth More than a Town with Hunger)." Porqué de
Michoacán 3(120):10.
Hernández Castillo, Rosalva Aída, and Ronald Nigh (n.d.) "Global Processes and Local
Identity: Indians of the Sierra Madre of Chiapas and the International
Organic Market." Paper presented at the American Anthropological
Association, Washington, DC, 1995.
Kessel, Fred, Peter Buzzanell, and Ron Lord (1993) Mexico's Sugar Industry--Current
and
Future Situation. Washington, DC: United States Department of
Agriculture.
Landázuri, Benítez, and Verónica Vázquez Mantecón (1988) Azúcar y estado (17501880)
(Sugar and State (1750-1880). México, DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Latin American Institute (1998) "Mexico Imposes New Tariff on U.S. High-Fructose
Corn
Syrup." Latin America Data Base 9(34):1-3.
Llambí, Luis (1996) "Globalización y nueva ruralidad en América Latina (Globalization
and
New Rurality in Latin America)." Pp. 75-98 in Sara María Lara Flores and

44

Michelle Chauvet (eds.) La sociedad rural mexicana frente al nuevo
milenio: La inserción de la agricultura mexicana en la economía mundial
(The Rural Mexican Society Facing the New Millennium), V. 1, Mexico,
DF: Plaza y Valdés.
Muñoz, Cuauhtémoc (1997) "Amenazan azucareros con bloqueo nacional a empresas
embotelladoras (Sugar Producers Threaten a National Blockade of
Bottling Companies)." Cuestión (newspaper), September 9, p. 2.
Otero, Gerardo (1996) "Neoliberal Reform and Politics in Mexico: An Overview." Pp.
1-25 in Gerardo Otero (ed.) Neo-liberalism Revisited: Economic
Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future. Boulder: Westview Press.
Paré, Luisa (1990) "La Industria Azucarera, en Charola de Plata (The Sugar Industry,
on a
Silver Platter)." Tiempos y Movimientos, Spring, Pp. 21-25.
Phillips, Lynne (1998) "Conclusion: Anthropology in the Age of Neoliberalism." Pp.
193-198 in Lynne Phillips (ed.) The Third Wave of Modernization in Latin
America: Cultural Perspectives on Neoliberalism. Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc.
Rubio, Blanca (1995) "Agricultura mundial, estructura productiva y nueva vía de
desarrollo
rural en América Latina (1970-1992) (World Agriculture, Productive
Structure and the new rural development in Latin America (1970-1992)."
Pp. 19-58 in Hubert Carton de Grammont (ed.) Globalización, deterioro
ambiental y reorganización social en el campo (Globalization,

45

Environmental Deterioration and Social Reorganization in the
Countryside). Mexico, DF: Universidad Autónoma de México.
Rudiño, Lourdes Edith (1997) "Fructosa, amarga competencia para la industria
azucarera
(Fructose, Bitter Competition for the Sugar Industry)." El Financiero
(newspaper), August 18, Pp. 28-30.
---------- (1998a) "Desplaza la fructosa de EU al azúcar mexicana: 150 mil
empleos en riesgo (U.S. Fructose displaces Mexican Sugar: 150 Thousand
Jobs at Risk)." El Financiero (newspaper), September 2, p. 23.
---------- (1998b) "Persiste el riesgo de quiebra de ingenios nacionales (The Risk of
Bankruptcy Persists for the National Sugar Mills)." El Financiero
(newspaper), February 3, p. 13.
Sánchez Gómez, Martha Judith (1995) "Actividades económicas y estrategias de
reproducción en tres comunidades hablantes de zapoteco en los valles de
Oaxaca (Economic Activities and Strategies of Reproduction in Three
Zapotec-speaking Communities in the Valleys of Oaxaca)." Pp. 161-194 in
Hubert Carton de Grammont (ed.) Globalización, deterioro ambiental y
reorganización social en el campo (Globalization, Environmental
Deterioration and Social Reorganization in the Countryside). Mexico, DF:
Universidad Autónoma de México.
Torres, Gabriel (1997) The Force of Irony: Power in the Everyday Life of Mexican
Tomato Workers. NY: Berg Press.
Flores, D. (1997) Mexican Agreement Limiting the Use of HFCS [Internet], AGR

46

Number
MX7092, Washington, DC: USDA [United States Department of
Agriculture]. Available from: <http://www.fas.usda.gov> [Accessed
October 2, 1997].
del Villar, Samuel I. (1976) "Depresión en la industria azucarera mexicana (Depression
in
the Mexican Sugar Industry)." Foro Internacional 16(4):526-585.

47

_____________________________________________________________________
Table 1. Improvements in the Sugar Industry, 1990 to 1997a
_____________________________________________________________________
1990

1997

Percentage Increase

Hectares Harvested

510,596

582,746

14.13

Cane Processed (tons)

34,893,129

42,170,674

20.86

Field Yield (tons/ha)

68.34

72.37

5.90

Sugar Produced (tons)

3,173,680

4,541,269

43.09

Sugar/Hectare (kg)

6,216

7,797

25.43

Percent Sucrose in Cane

11.65

13.46 (1996)

15.54

Percent Factory Yield

9.10

10.78

18.46

_____________________________________________________________________
aSource:

Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera.

___________________________________________________________________
Table 2. Mexican Imports of HFCS (High Fructose Corn Syrup), 1992-1997a
___________________________________________________________________
Year

Tons of HFCS Imported

1992

20,000

1993

57,000

1994

113,000

1995

131,000

1996

261,000

1997

350,000

Total

932,000

___________________________________________________________________
a

Source: Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera.

Figure 1. Map of Mexican Sugar Millsa
a

Source: Adapted from James B. Pick, Edgar W. Butler, and Elizabeth L. Lanzer (1989)

Atlas of Mexico. Boulder: Westview Press.
Figure 2. The wall mural at the Puruarán sugar mill
Figure 3. A section of the wall declaring "We will conquer" (Venceremos) and "For the
people, what is of the people, and NOT for the good of the bosses" (Para el pueblo lo
que es del pueblo y no para bien de patrones")
Figure 4. A depiction of Emiliano Zapata, accompanied by the words "Long live
Zapata" (Viva Zapata)
Figure 5. The image of Che Guevara
Figure 6. A section of the wall demanding "Work for all" (Trabajo para todos)
Figure 7. A mural adjoining the sugar mill depicting the community's struggle against
what they perceive to be corrupt businessmen

